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Introduction
In New Zealand executive power is 
concentrated in the hands of  the prime 
minister and ministers, all being members 
of  an elected parliament upon whose 
continuing support they depend. This 
substantive power relationship is embedded 
in a constitutional structure in which an 
appointed governor-general acts as head  
of  state, as representative of  the monarch, 
who is also the monarch of  the United  
Kingdom. By convention and law the  
head of  state acts on the advice of  the  
prime minister and ministers in all but 
exceptional circumstances.
Reliance on a geographically remote monarch seems 
anomalous to many and it is likely that at some point New 
Zealand will sever its ties with the English Crown and 
establish a republic with either an appointed or an elected 
head of  state. But there is uncertainty about the extent to 
which proponents of  change in constitutional form also 
envisage change in the substantive power relationships 
existing between the prime minister, Cabinet, ministers of  
the Crown and Parliament. The head of  state occupies a 
pivotal position in relation to the executive, legislative and 
judicial branches of  government so that any change in the 
form, function or powers of  the head of  state is likely to 
have wide ramifications.
Such changes are best made after an ongoing debate in 
which major issues have been identified, options canvassed 
and implications considered. It would be wrong to assume 
that a change from a monarchy to a republic is essentially 
a matter of  form, easily accomplished at a convenient 
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moment, such as following the death of  the current monarch. 
The 1999 Australian referendum, on a republic with an 
appointed head of  state, provided an object lesson on the 
pitfalls of  putting one particular republican form to a vote in 
an environment where public discussion had not generated 
sufficient clarity around the main alternatives that might 
have been considered.
This brief  article seeks to identify the major issues likely to 
arise in designing a republican constitution, particularly those 
relating to the role and powers of  the head of  state. It outlines 
a programme by which these issues might be explored. The 
objective is to clarify the implications of  various possible 
changes rather than to advocate any particular course of  
action. Indeed, it is possible that we should be making no 
change at all. But that is a decision for the electorate as a 
whole, ideally informed by an understanding of  the likely 
implications of  various possible changes as compared with 
existing arrangements.
The powers of  a head of  state and the mode of  selection 
are interrelated. Election establishes a democratic mandate 
and with that a common expectation that the person elected 
carries more authority than he or she would have if  simply 
appointed. This interdependence suggests 
ordering our discussion around alternative 
views on the range of  powers that might be 
accorded to the head of  state.
I first review what would be involved 
in maintaining the current constitutional 
balance between an appointed governor-
general and a prime minister responsible to 
Parliament, whilst severing the link to the 
Crown. I consider two options, under each 
of  which the governor-general continues 
in his or her current role. Under the first 
option the governor-general is simply 
elevated to the position of  head of  state. Under the second 
option an additional formal entity is created, available for 
advice during times of  constitutional stress and hopefully 
over time accruing some of  the symbolic status that currently 
attaches to the monarch. Under either option various 
methods of  appointment are possible. I then look at models 
where there is an elected president, starting with the Irish 
example, where the president exercises a fairly minimal 
set of  additional powers. Next I consider what have been 
characterised as ‘semi-presidential’ systems, where an elected 
president shares some element of  executive power with 
a prime minister responsible to an elected legislature, and 
conclude with reference to full presidential systems as in the 
United States, where the president heads the executive arm 
of  government.
The current position in New Zealand – an appointed governor-
general
The governor-general, appointed on the advice of  the prime 
minister and government, represents the Queen, as sovereign 
of  New Zealand. In recent decades all governors-general 
have been New Zealand-born, with significant records of  
participation in public affairs. The governor-general performs 
important constitutional and ceremonial roles such as opening 
(and dissolving) Parliament, swearing in ministers, receiving 
the credentials of  foreign diplomatic representatives, and 
investitures. In addition, governors-general maintain a busy 
programme interacting with New Zealand communities and, 
on occasion, make state visits overseas. The governor-general 
regularly chairs meetings of  the Executive Council, formally 
approves legislation on behalf  of  the monarch and, centrally, 
holds important powers in relation to the appointment of  the 
prime minister and the dissolution of  Parliament.
As in other parliamentary democracies of  the Westminster 
type, the governor-general ordinarily follows the advice of  
the prime minister, and ministers, in exercising his or her 
legal powers, to the extent that some have seen the post 
as little more than a rubber stamp. But governors-general 
possess reserve powers that may be exercised in exceptional 
circumstances, without the advice of  ministers. The main 
reserve powers are: to appoint a prime minister; to dismiss 
a prime minister; to refuse to dissolve a Parliament; and, in 
limited circumstances, to force a dissolution.
There have been no recent incidents of  significance 
in New Zealand, but the 20th-century history of  
Commonwealth countries (including the United Kingdom), 
and of  the constitutional monarchies of  Western Europe, 
records significant interventions by heads of  state, in relation 
to the position of  the prime minister or the dissolution of  
Parliament. Three examples will suffice. In 1931 King 
George V encouraged the Labour prime minister, Ramsay 
MacDonald, faced with a serious division in the Cabinet, 
to form a ‘National’ government in alliance with members 
of  the Conservative opposition, thereby splitting his own 
parliamentary Labour party. In 1975, the Australian 
governor-general, Sir John Kerr, dismissed the prime minister, 
Gough Whitlam, and, more recently, Fijian governors-general 
have played a role in the aftermath of  military coups.
Such events are inevitably controversial. But the essential 
point is that reserve powers, wisely used or not, are a 
necessary underpinning in constitutional systems where 
the prime minister depends upon his or her being able to 
maintain the support of  a majority in Parliament. That 
support will occasionally fail and whilst, in the normal course 
the essential point is that reserve powers ... 
are a necessary underpinning in constitutional 
systems where the prime minister [is] able 
to maintain the support of a majority in 
Parliament.
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of  events, the parliamentary players will resolve the problem 
themselves, there may come a point where the head of  state 
sees a need to act, so as to resolve a hiatus or to protect the 
constitution. Attempts to codify the circumstances under 
which such reserve powers should be exercised are unlikely 
to cover every contingency and may unreasonably limit 
the head of  state’s power to act appropriately in extreme 
circumstances.
The governor-general, as a member of  the Executive 
Council, and as the assenting signatory to bills passed by 
Parliament, is privy to important political matters. In Britain 
the Queen is seen as having the right, and some argue duty, 
to express her views on such matters to ministers, conditional 
on keeping those views private, and subject to the ongoing 
obligation to act on the advice of  those ministers. Dame 
Sylvia Cartwright, speaking towards the end of  her term 
as governor-general of  New Zealand, reported: ‘Executive 
Council meetings, which are generally held every Monday, 
give me the opportunity – and I take it on a regular basis – 
to ask Ministers questions about the conduct of  government 
business’ (Cartwright, 2006). Governors-general are 
politically aware citizens. The need to maintain, and to be 
seen as maintaining, political neutrality in the performance 
of  their role necessarily circumscribes their ability to take 
a public position on major issues of  the day. Nevertheless, 
governors-general are expected to speak on an extraordinary 
range of  occasions and will, inevitably, sometimes touch 
upon politically sensitive issues.
Minimalist change – an appointed president
What would be involved in a minimalist change from the 
present structure?
The key change would be severance of  the tie to the Queen 
of  England. Under our first two options this entails elevating 
the office of  the governor-general from its current position 
as Queen’s representative to head of  state in its own right. 
Current arrangements for the selection of  a new governor-
general, or president, would remain in place but the detailed 
mechanics of  appointment would have to change.
At present the government recommends the chosen 
person to the monarch for approval and appointment as 
governor-general. By convention the monarch accepts the 
recommendation, but there is an inherent possibility that she, 
or he, might query or object to the suggestion. So it would 
be sensible to expose the prime minister’s recommendation 
to scrutiny by an external body. Obvious possibilities include: 
Parliament, a committee of  MPs (in effect extending the 
current practice of  prior consultation with the leader of  the 
opposition); a panel of  eminent persons (selected by position 
or eminence); or a panel of  citizens. The proposal embodied 
in the 1999 Australian republican referendum envisaged that 
the president would be appointed by two-thirds majority 
vote of  the House of  Representatives, following nomination 
by the prime minister and secondment by the leader of  the 
opposition. An earlier Australian proposal, advanced during 
the 1990s by Richard McGarvie, was to create a three-
member Constitutional Council, appointed by formula 
from former governors-general and judges. The council, on 
receipt of  advice from the prime minister, would appoint his 
or her nominee as governor-general. The council would also 
be required to dismiss an incumbent governor-general within 
two weeks of  receiving advice from the prime minister.
As New Zealand head of  state, the Queen, normally 
through the governor-general, but occasionally in person, 
plays key symbolic roles in relation to the judicial system and 
to the armed forces. The ‘Crown’ of  itself  is a powerful and 
ubiquitous symbol, and particularly in some areas, such as 
Mäori-Päkehä relations and the Treaty of  Waitangi, is seen 
as having more than symbolic status. Treaty-related issues 
are discussed separately later, but the symbolic status of  the 
Crown suggests a need for a review of  the likely consequences, 
across the field, of  removing the link to the ‘Crown’ and an 
exploration of  mechanisms that might possibly augment or 
complement the role of  an appointed head of  state. The 
hereditary monarchy, combining as it does long history, 
echoes of  once awesome powers, and a more recent but still 
long tradition of  studiously apolitical behaviour, provides a 
convenient politically neutral personification of  the state. 
The past few decades have probably weakened that status 
but it remains strong. Nation states require symbolic central 
reference points, so that removal of  the status and symbolism 
of  the monarchy suggests a need to consider institutional 
innovations to replace them.
Under our second minimalist option an attempt would be 
made to vest some symbolic power in New Zealand entities 
or sites whilst maintaining the current position and powers 
of  the governor-general (possibly renamed president).
A written constitution, formalising the key power 
relationships within the state, would itself  constitute a 
powerful symbol. Another obvious possibility would be to 
augment the role of  the body responsible for approving the 
prime minister’s recommendation on appointment of  the 
governor-general. In practice the governor-general already 
acts as head of  state, and the Queen’s role is essentially 
symbolic. That said, it is always the case that persons in 
positions of  authority will, under some circumstances, find it 
useful to be able to seek advice and guidance. A Constitutional 
Council, with a wider role than that proposed by McGarvie 
in Australia, would provide a legally constituted reference 
point, available to offer advice, for example, to a governor-
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Historically important examples of semi-presidential states include Weimar 
Germany, where the division of powers, along with the extreme form of 
proportional representation in the Reichstag, were held to have contributed  
to the failure of that system in the face of Nazism, and France since 1958, 
under the fifth republic.
general contemplating exercise of  the reserve powers at times 
of  constitutional stress or crisis.
Removal of  the monarch effectively removes a layer of  
recourse from within the constitutional structure and thus 
may occasion a need to review the constraints within which 
a New Zealand head of  state would operate. Under our 
second option the New Zealand entity (possibly named a 
Constitutional Council) would provide an additional layer of  
responsibility and recourse within the system and could be 
expected to accrue symbolic status over time.
More generally, either of  our two minimalist adjustments 
would require amendment of  a substantial swathe of  
legislation, including a rewriting of  the Constitution Act and 
almost certainly further codification of  the constitution.
An elected president – a minimalist model
Election confers a democratic mandate to a president, 
particularly when election is by popular vote rather than 
indirectly through Parliament. A popular mandate inevitably 
brings some degree of  extra moral authority, and thereby 
potential power. It is also likely that election will bring 
change to the range of  persons from which presidents are 
selected. Political parties are likely to nominate candidates, so 
that elected presidents can be expected to have rather more 
strongly defined political characteristics than appointees. 
Some non-party persons who would accept an appointed 
position may well blanch at submitting themselves to a 
competitive national election.
Election establishes a president in that position as of  right 
and so encourages more confident expression of  personal 
opinion. Any such tendency will, however, stand in conflict 
with the convention that the head of  state in a parliamentary 
system does not express him or herself  in public on major 
policy issues. The term of  Mary Robinson as elected 
president of  the Irish Republic illustrates the tensions that 
may be generated when previously active politicians succeed 
to the presidency.
In her inaugural address Robinson identified issues 
which she would like to address during her presidency, 
several of  which led to tensions between her and the elected 
government. In 1992 Robinson expressed sympathy for 
the sense of  frustration felt by Irish women and girls in the 
face of  a government decision to restrain a young woman 
travelling to Britain to secure an abortion. In 1993 Robinson 
shook hands with Gerry Adams of  Sinn Fein at a meeting 
in west Belfast, at a time when Sinn Fein was banned from 
Irish and British broadcasting and Adams denied a visa to 
the United States. Robinson’s strong interest in human rights 
in the Third World led to an invitation to co-chair a panel 
on the future of  the United Nations, an invitation that she 
declined only after strong political pressure.
The Irish constitution provides mechanisms by which 
the president may refer legislation to the Supreme Court to 
test its constitutionality, or, in response to a petition from the 
Senate, withhold his or her signature pending a referendum 
or dissolution of  the lower house. These provide more 
explicit, but also more circumscribed, mechanisms than the 
shadowy and rarely used power of  a governor-general in 
most Westminster democracies to seek to modify a bill by 
refusing assent. In New Zealand explicit powers to withhold 
assent, and indeed to amend bills, which had been a feature of  
New Zealand law from colonial times, were omitted from the 
replacement Constitution Act of  1986. It was asserted that 
the change did not affect the underlying power, subject, as it 
is, to the strong convention that the governor-general follows 
the advice of  responsible ministers in all but exceptional 
circumstances.
There are, of  course, many other examples of  elected 
presidents with normally minimal, but potentially important, 
powers. Because an elected president with limited powers 
is the most likely alternative to an appointed presidency, it 
would be useful to review experience in an array of  countries, 
such as Ireland, Finland and India, with particular reference 
to the powers accorded to the president, to the constitutional 
constraints under which the president operates, to the 
sources of  advice available to the president, and to the mode 
of  election.
Shared powers – a semi-presidential system
The term ‘semi-presidentialism’ is variously defined, but I use 
it to describe systems in which there is an elected president, 
constitutionally endowed with personal prerogatives, 
alongside a prime minister and ministers entrusted with 
executive and governmental powers that they can exercise 
only so long as Parliament leaves them in office. The 
constitutional boundary between presidential and prime 
ministerial powers differs from case to case, with particular 
significance attaching to the role of  the president in relation 
to the appointment of  the prime minister, the relationship 
between Cabinet ministers and the legislature, presidential 
approval of  legislation, recourse to emergency powers, and 
the president’s role in foreign affairs. Experience shows that 
much also depends on the party affiliation and position of  
the president, the personalities of  the prime minister and 
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president, circumstances prevailing at particular moments 
and evolving precedents.
Historically important examples of  semi-presidential 
states include Weimar Germany, where the division of  powers, 
along with the extreme form of  proportional representation 
in the Reichstag, were held to have contributed to the failure 
of  that system in the face of  Nazism, and France since 
1958, under the fifth republic. In the post-war period many 
newly independent nations and, more recently, many of  the 
successor states to communist regimes in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe have adopted semi-presidential 
systems. The multiplication of  practical examples has led to 
increased academic attention (Duverger, 1980; Elgie, 1995; 
Siaroff, 2003; Skach, 2006, Power, 2008).
Division of  power between a president and a prime 
minister, taken together with the fact that each can claim a 
democratic mandate, creates the possibility that differences 
between the two, on important issues of  policy, or in times of  
emergency, will lead to conflict over who has final decision 
authority. Grey areas in law may encourage intransigence 
and create situations in which the president is tempted to 
exert undue influence on the basis of  his or her constitutional 
ability to exercise emergency powers, buttressed as those 
usually are by a constitutional role as commander-in chief  
of  the armed forces.
The boundary between presidential and prime-
ministerial powers is clearly critical. That it also lies on a 
continuum is illustrated by the fact that the Irish constitution, 
which subjects the executive government to the oversight of  
Parliament, is nevertheless sometimes categorised as semi-
presidential. If  the constitutional debate in New Zealand is to 
include semi-presidentialism as a form to be considered, that 
debate would desirably be informed by analyses of  the range 
of  prerogative powers that might be accorded to a president, 
how these might impact on the powers of  the prime minister, 
and their implications for the body of  New Zealand law.
A presidential system
A full presidential system along American lines is the final 
option to be considered. The 2004 Australian Senate inquiry 
report The Road to a Republic concluded, on the basis of  
survey data, that this option was not widely favoured in 
Australia. Nevertheless, such a model will be in some people’s 
minds when they talk of  movement to a republic and it seems 
sensible to canvass this option within any programme aimed 
at testing public opinion on republican options in New 
Zealand.
The essential feature of  the American system is that 
executive power is concentrated in the president and that 
there is no prime minister. The legislature exists as a separate 
arm of  government and, impeachment for misconduct 
aside, does not have the power to bring down the president. 
It does have the power to veto appointment to some key 
government positions and it may also frustrate the executive 
by refusing to pass legislation promoted by the executive or 
by passing legislation contrary to its wishes. The president 
and the legislature are elected by popular election, but there 
is nothing in the system to guarantee that the executive arm 
as a whole has the confidence of  the legislature. Different 
political parties may hold the presidency and effective power 
in the Congress.
Any move to a system approximating that in the United 
States would be a truly radical change and would require 
parallel consideration of  issues such as the adoption of  
a written constitution and the constitutional separation 
of  powers between the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of  government.
Powers of the prime minister
Our focus has been on the powers that might be accorded to 
a president under various constitutional options. The range 
of  issues that have arisen suggests that it will be sensible to 
review in parallel the powers to be accorded to the prime 
minister under that same set of  options. Movement from a 
monarchy focuses attention on the powers of  the new head 
of  state and whether these should be reduced or augmented. 
Coming at the issue from the perspective of  the contemporary 
functioning of  New Zealand’s parliamentary democracy, the 
role of  the prime minister is properly seen as central. Indeed, 
some argue that the powers of  a prime minister, responsible to 
a single house of  Parliament, are greater than those enjoyed 
by a president constrained by constitutionally separate 
legislative and judicial arms. This possibility suggests a need 
to consider institutional changes that would constrain prime 
ministerial powers, in areas such as the timing of  elections. 
MMP has augmented political constraints on the position of  
prime minister but the constitutional issue remains.
The primary focus for many of  those seeking a republic 
is the move from the monarchy and it is not clear whether 
advocates of  change are content with the basic framework 
of  a prime minister dependent on the continuing support of  
a majority in Parliament, or whether they are also seeking 
change in this central, and arguably more fundamental, 
feature of  New Zealand’s constitutional system. There is 
therefore a strong case for examining the role and powers 
of  the prime minister within our Westminster system, 
and considering how these might change under different 
republican alternatives. A vote on whether or not to move to 
a republic is likely to be conditional on the form of  republic 
proposed.
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Wider issues
Despite its largely symbolic status, the Crown is central to 
the constitutional framework. Its removal would affect power 
relationships along several dimensions. This article has 
focused on the relative powers of  the head of  state and the 
prime minister, but other relationships will also be affected. 
What is the role of  Parliament in relation to the head of  state? 
Does it play a part in selecting and appointing that person? 
Does it have a constitutional role enabling it to remove the 
head of  state from office in some circumstances? What is the 
role of  the head of  state with reference to legislation passed 
by Parliament?
Any constitution embodies a system of  checks and 
balances. The powerful position of  a prime minister 
supported by Parliament is ultimately subject to the will of  
the electorate. In the shorter term it is subject to the law, as 
interpreted by the courts, and to the potential exercise of  
such powers as the head of  state may exercise. If  the chosen 
constitution holds those powers to a minimal level then it 
may be appropriate to consider again the case for a second 
parliamentary chamber.
Any wider rewriting of  New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements should desirably also consider their 
relationship with the evolving pattern of  international law 
and precedent. Nations do not exist in isolation, and in recent 
decades national legal structures have been affected by the 
developing pattern of  international law on human rights 
and the developing integration of  commercial law between 
groups of  countries. New Zealand’s legal framework, like its 
constitutional structure, was nurtured within the template of  
British law. A stocktake at this point in time will show many 
linkages to international covenants, some of  which may be 
sufficiently fundamental as to warrant explicit constitutional 
linkage.
The Crown has a continuing role as signatory to the 
Treaty of  Waitangi. Most Mäori and Päkehä commentators 
see a sharp contrast between the undertakings made when 
Governor Hobson signed the Treaty on behalf  of  the Crown 
and the actions of  successor settler governments, actions 
which created the grievances that give rise to the continuing 
series of  Treaty claims and settlements. Contemporary 
settlements are, of  course, agreements between the Crown 
and affected Mäori. Removal of  the Crown from the 
constitution and the likely codification of  the constitution will 
raise major issues for Mäori. Identification and resolution of  
these issues may well be difficult and time-consuming and 
will require ongoing cross-cultural dialogue. Consideration 
of  a move to a republic will in any event need to be carried 
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